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OLD RULE, NEW THEORY: REVISING THE
PERSONAL BENEFIT REQUIREMENT FOR
TIPPER/TIPPEE LIABILITY UNDER THE
MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY OF
INSIDER TRADING
Abstract: Under the classical theory of insider trading, tipper/tippee li-
ability may arise only when the tipper makes the relevant disclosure to
obtain a personal benefit. Courts are divided, however, as to whether
this personal benefit requirement applies to the misappropriation the-
ory of insider trading. This Note argues that because the personal
benefit requirement is severely flawed, courts should not impose it in
misappropriation cases. Instead, courts adjudicating misappropriation
cases should require that (1) the tipper was at least reckless as to
whether he or she would either benefit personally or harm the informa-
tion source by tipping, and (2) the tipper was at least reckless as to
whether someone in the line of tippees would use the information to
trade. This standard should be subject only to the tipper's defense that
the disclosure was made in a good faith attempt to prevent criminal ac-
tivity reasonably certain to cause substantial physical or financial harm
to others.
INTRODUCTION
Suppose that you, the CEO of Acme Corporation, disclose to
your Vice President that your company plans to make a tender offer
for Zen Corporation.' You warn the Vice President that this informa-
tion is sensitive and confidential and must not be discussed with any-
one outside of the office. He agrees to keep the secret. Unbeknownst
to you, however, the Vice President dislikes you and your company,
plans to quit soon, and does not feel particularly loyal.
After work, the Vice President gets a haircut. During the haircut,
the barber asks the Vice President whether Acme Corporation plans
to buy any other companies soon. The Vice President knows the bar-
ber is an avid stock trader because the barber often talks about his
investments. He also believes that the barber is probing for informa-
For a set of facts similar to those provided in this hypothetical, see SEC v. Maxwell,
341 F. Stipp. 2d 941, 993-95 (S.D. Ohio MM.
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548	 Bohm College Law Review	 [Vol. 47:547
tion with high trading value. The barber has mentioned that he and
his friends enjoy finding and then investing in acquisition targets, and
every time he gives the Vice President a haircut, he goes out of his way
to ask whether Acme Corporation plans to make any acquisitions in
the near future.
The Vice President also knows that anyone who buys stock in Zen
Corporation now would likely enjoy a large profit due to the upcom-
ing offer. In addition, the Vice President knows that there is a substan-
tial chance that leaking information about the tender offer would
harm his company because leaking information about an upcoming
acquisition may cause the acquisition to fall apart.
Nevertheless, the Vice President is tired of having to watch his
words for a company he dislikes. Indifferent to the consequences, he
tells the barber about the upcoming offer. He does not speak in order
to bestow a gift upon the barber, who is not his friend. He also does
not speak in order to obtain a better haircut, a better price, or a good
reputation with the barber. 2 He simply does not feel like watching his
words.
In fact, the barber was probing for information with high trading
value. Knowing that the Vice President probably was not supposed to
talk about thC upcoming tender offer, the barber quickly tells his
friends and they all use the information to buy stock in Zen Corpora-
tion. Zen Corporation's stock price rises.
In addition, because the barber's friends are not careful about
whom they tell, rumors spread about an upcoming tender offer for
Zen Corporation, eventually causing two more companies to join the
bidding war. Ultimately, your company must abandon its contem-
plated offer because the bidding war has pushed the purchase price
too high. Your company missed a perfect opportunity to expand its
business. People learn that you told the Vice President about the up-
coming offer and, as a result, your reputation is damaged. Meanwhile,
the barber and his friends sell their stock in Zen Corporation, reaping
millions in profits.
Despite the Vice President's conscious disregard of a substantial
risk that the barber would trade based on the information and that
his disclosure would cause you and your company tremendous harm,
2 See id. at 948 & n.2 ("IC:liven [the insider-tipper's and barber-tippee'sJ relative sta-
tions in life, any reputational benefit to [the insider-tipper] in the eyes of his barber is
extremely unlikely to have translated into any meaningful future advantage.... 'Surely it
cannot be claimed that the purpose of the alleged disclosure was so [the insider-tipper]
would receive a better haircut, a better appointment slot, a better price?'").
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some courts and authors would insist that he escape all federal insider
trading liability.3 They reason that the Vice President sought no per-
sonal benefit in disclosing the information with which you entrusted
him. 4 This seems wrong, however. After all, your company is de-
frauded of the exclusive use of the information with which you en-
trusted the Vice President. Furthermore, the integrity of the securities
markets is harmed as a result. What is the basis for the personal
benefit requirement?
In 1983, in Dirks v. SEC, the U.S. Supreme Court held that where
a corporate insider discloses material, nonpublic information to one
who then uses that information to trade in the stock of the insider's
corporation, the corporate insider and the trader arc not liable unless
the tipper personally benefited from making the tip. 6 The Court rea-
soned that where a tipper does not personally benefit, the tip does
not constitute a breach of duty to the corporation's shareholders. 6
3 See, e.g., SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003); SEC v. Gonzalez de Castilla,
184 F. Supp. 2d 365, 374-75 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); SEC v. Blackman, No. 3:99-1072, 2000 WL
868770, at *6-8 (M.D. Tenn. May 26, 2000); Stevens v. O'Brien Envd. Energy, Inc., 11999
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CC13) 11 90,475, at 92,242 (E.D. Pa. May 10, 1999); SEC v.
Trikilis, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (Cal) 1 97,015, at 97,462 (C.1). Cal. July 28, 1992), vacated on other
grounds, [1992-1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCU) 1 97,375, at 95,981 (C.D. Cal.
Jan. 22, 1993); . Nelson S. Ebaugh, Insider Trading Liability for Tippers and Tippees: A Call for the
Consistent Application of the Personal Benefit Test, 39 Tax. J, Bus. L. 265, 288-93 (2003); Craig W.
Davis, Comment, Misapprotniators, Tippees and the Intent-to-Benefit Rule: What Can We Learn from
Cady, Roberts?, 35 SE'roN HALL L. Rev. 263, 291-97 (2004); Jeffrey Plotkin, The Tipper Benefit
Test Under the Misappropriation Theory, NN.L.J., Aug. 15, 2003, at 4, 5.
4 See Yun, 327 F.3d at 1275; Ebaugh, supra note 3, at 288-93. Although one might try to
argue that the Vice President sought the "benefit" of speaking freely, this is likely too trivial
to meet the personal benefit standard. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663-64 (1983) (iden-
tifying personal benefits of consequence for the requirement that the tipper intend to
benefit personally from the lip, such as a pecuniary gain, an enhanced reputation, or the
satisfaction of making a valuable gift to a relative or friend); Maxwell, 341 F. Supp. 2d at
948 (holding that there was no personal benefit where the tipper-insider tipped his barber
because "Dirks requires an intended benefit of at least some consequence" and there was
no evidence that the tipper-executive sought money, a reputational gain, or the satisfaction
of giving a gift to the barber); SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Stipp. 756, 766 (W.D. Okla. 1984)
(holding that there was no personal benefit where a father-tipper made the disclosure for
the purpose of making child care arrangements).
5 463 U.S. at (162. Inlbrmation is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a rea-
sonable investor would consider it important when deciding how to invest. See Basic Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988). To he nonpublic, information must be specific and
inure private than general rumor. United States v. Mylett, 97 F.3d 663, 666 (2d Cir, 1996).
For purposes of this Note, a "tipper" is a person who discloses material, nonpublic infor-
mation to another person. If the recipient of that information uses it by trading or passing
it along to others, that recipient. is a "tippee." Depending on the circumstances, both the
tipper and the tippee may be held liable for insider trading. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662.
6 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662.
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Absent such a breach, neither the tipper nor the tippee can be liable
for insider trading, in part because breach of duty is an important
"limiting principle" that protects tippers and tippees from unreason-
able enforcement actions by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(the "SEC" ). 7 The Court decided the case under the so-called "classi-
cal theory" of insider trading, which posits that a person who owes a
fiduciary duty to a corporation's shareholders must not use material,
nonpublic information about the corporation to trade in the corpora-
tion's stock unless the person first discloses the information to the
shareholders. 8
Subsequently, in 1997, in United Stales v. O'Hagan, the Supreme
Court adopted an additional theory of insider trading—the misap-
propriation theory—under which the Vice President in the example
above could be prosecuted.9 Similar to the classical theory, the misap-
propriation theory was also designed to protect investors. 10 The mis-
appropriation theory, however, differs from the classical theory in a
crucial way: the fraud victim is not a shareholder of the traded corpo-
ration, but rather the source of the information used for the trade."
In other words, misappropriation liability arises when a trader or tip-
per breaches a fiduciary duty to the source of the information, rather
than a duty to shareholders of the corporation whose stock is bought
or sold. 12
Since O'Hagan, this fundamental difference has caused confusion
as to which aspects of the classical theory should apply to misappro-
priation cases. 13 For instance, it is unclear whether a misappropria-
7 Id. at 662, 664 & 11.24 (suggesting that the SEC has sent mixed signals to the public
regarding who will be subject to its enforcement actions, and that legal limitations are
therefore necessary). •
Id. at 653-61. For the purpose of brevity, cases decided under the classical theory of
insider trading will hereinafter be referred to as "classical cases."
9 See United States v. O'l•agan, 521 U.S. 642, 650 (1997). The Vice President also
could likely be prosecuted under SEC Rule 14e-3. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (2005)
(prohibiting trading on the basis of material, nonpublic information regarding an upcom-
ing tender offer that the trader knows, or has reason to know, was acquired from an in-
sider of the offeror or issuer, or someone working on their behalf); id. § 240.14e-3(d)
(prohibiting disclosure when it is reasonably foreseeable that the disclosure is likely to
result in a trade that violates Rule 14e-3(a)).
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652-53.
11 See id.
12 See id.
15 See SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68, 77 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting disagreement as to
whether the personal benefit requirement for tipper/tippee liability should apply to mis-
appropriation cases); Donna M. Nagy, Reframing the Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trad-
ing Liability: A Past-OlIagan Suggestion, 59 OHIO Sr. L.I. 1223, 1287-310 (1998) (arguing
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tor's disclosure to the source of the intention to trade is sufficient to
negate liability in the same way that disclosure to shareholders ne-
gates liability in classical cases." Another unresolved issue is whether
the misappropriation theory precludes tipper/tippee liability where
the tipper does not seek to benefit from the tip. 15 Dirks established
that such preclusion clearly exists under the classical theory, but
courts are divided as to whether this is also true under the misappro-
priation theory. 1 °
Part I of this Note reviews the common-law development of in-
skier trading laws under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
and SEC Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder." In doing so, this Part
examines the two theories of insider trading: the classical and misap-
propriation theories.i° Part H focuses specifically on the liability of
tippers and tippees for insider trading. 19 This Part examines the cir-
cumstances in which insider trading liability may arise when a person
who holds material, nonpublic information discloses that information
to one who then trades.2° Part n also gives special attention to the re-
quirement, under Dirks, that the tipper personally benefit by making
the tip. 21 Part III argues that courts should not impose the personal
benefit requirement in cases brought under the misappropriation
that despite dicta in O'Hagan suggesting. the contrary, disclosure to the source in misap-
propriation cases, unlike disclosure to shareholders in classical cases, does not fully negate
the trader's or tipper's deception of °diet's).
14 See O'llagati, 521 U.S. at 654-55. The O 'Hagan Court stated that disclosure to the in-
formation source prior to trading undermines the claim of deception of the information
source and thus also does not constitute a SEC Rule 10b-5 violation of fraud in securities
trading. Id. at 655. This was merely dicta, however, and a compelling argument can be
made that deception still remains even when such disclosure is made. See id. at 647-48,
654-55 (demonstrating that the Court's assertion was merely dicta because the defendant
in the case did not disclose to the information source his intent to trade); Nagy, supra note
13, at 1287-310 (arguing that deception remains even in the face of disclosure to the
source). For instance, the investors with whom the misappropriator trades are arguably still
deceived. Nagy, supra note 13, at 1287-310 (arguing that courts faced with cases involving
such disclosure could find that the investors with whom the misappropriator trades are still
deceived),
15 See Sargent, 229 F.3d at 77 (noting disagreement among courts).
16 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662 (requiring a personal benefit in classical cases); Yun, 327
F.3d at 1275 (requiring a personal benefit in misappropriation cases); SEC v. Willis, 777 F.
Stipp. 1165,1172 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (requiring no personal benefit in misappropriation
cases).
17 See infra notes 25-80 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 25-80 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 81-150 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 81-150 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 81-150 and accompanying text.
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theory.22 Instead, this Part explains, courts should require that (1) the
tipper was at least reckless as to whether he or she would either benefit
personally or harm the information source by tipping, and (2) the
tipper was at least reckless as to whether someone in the line of tip-
pees would use the information to trade." This standard should be
subject only to the tipper's defense that the tipper made the disclosure
in a good faith attempt to prevent criminal activity reasonably certain
to cause substantial physical or financial harm to others."
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF INSIDER TRADING PROHIBITION UNDER
SECTION 10(B) AND RULE 10B-5
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and SEC
Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, provide the primary basis for
courts' proscription of insider trading. 25 Together, they create a broad
prohibition of fraud in connection with securities trades. 26 The scope
of the prohibited conduct has evolved over decades through interpre-
tations by the courts and the SEC, and through this evolution, two
theories of insider trading have emerged: the classical and misappro-
priation theories. 27
A. The Classical Theory
Initially, insider trading was proscribed through what is now
known as the classical theory. 28 In its early stages, its scope was un-
clear.29
 Government prosecutors attempted to require anyone in pos-
session of material, nonpublic information about a corporation either
22 See infra notes 151-270 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 151-270 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 151-270 and accompanying text.
25 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.1013-5 (2005); 3 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.17,
at 492 (5th ed. 2005) (identifying Rule 10b-5 as the primary basis for the prohibition of.
insider trading). In the special situation where the information used for trading relates to
a tender offer, the trade is also subject to Rule 14e-3, which proscribes trading on the basis
of material, nonpublic information regarding an upcoming tender offer if the trader
knows, or has reason to know, that the information has been acquired from an insider of
the offeror or issuer, or someone working on their behalf, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (2005).
26 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10-5.
27 See United States v. Cr Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-52 (1997).
25 See id.
25 See Daniell. Bacastow, Comment, Due Process and Criminal Penalties Under Rule 10b-5:
The Unconstitutionality and Inefficiency of Criminal Prosecutions far Insider Trading, 731 CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 96, 108 (1982) (noting that "the insider confronting the issue of 10b-5
liability is faced with a calculus of uncertainties").
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to disclose that information to the marketplace or refrain from trad-
ing in that corporation's stock." Whether courts would ultimately
sanction such a broad rule, however, remained to be seen.si
In 1961, the SEC laid the groundwork for this broad rule in In re
Cady, Roberts & Co." In Cady, Roberts, the directors of a public com-
pany decided to reduce the company's dividends." Soon after the de-
cision was made, one of the directors telephoned a broker to com-
municate the upcoming reduction.34 The broker then sold 7000
shares of the company's stock before the company publicly an-
nounced the dividend cut to the marketplace." The public an-
nouncement of the cut caused the stock price to fall, and therefore
the broker avoided significant losses by selling prior to the an-
nouncement."
As part of the settlement between the brokerage firm and the
SEC, the SEC explained how the broker's sales violated Rule I Ob-5."
The SEC stated that insider trading liability is premised on a relation-
ship that provides access to information intended only for a corporate
purpose, as well as the "inherent unfairness" involved where a party
takes advantage of the information gained from the special relation-
ship while knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he deals."
Thus, the broker violated Rule 101)-5 when he took advantage of his
access to this material, nonpublic information for trading purposes
knowing that the investing public remained unaware of it."
In 1968, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit en-
dorsed the SEC's broad theory. 4° In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., the
Second Circuit stated that anyone who possesses material, nonpublic
information about a company must either disclose that information to
" See SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2c1 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (adopting this
broad requirement).
11 See id, cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (demonstrating the U.S. Supreme Courts
decision not yet to resolve the matter).
32 See 40 S.E.C. 907, 910-18 (1961).
33 Id. at 909.
34 Id.
35 Id.
311 Id. at 909-10.
37 Cady, Roberts, 90 S.E.C. at 907-08, 910-18.
33 Id. at 912.
" See id. at 910-18.
4° See Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 848.
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the investing public or abstain from trading in that company's stock. 41
The court reasoned that this rule protected the justifiable expectation
of the marketplace that all investors enjoy relatively equal access to
material information.42
In 1980, however, in Chiarella v. United States, the U.S. Supreme
Court rejected this "equal access" rule.° In Chiarella, which remains the
law today, the Court significantly narrowed the scope of the classical
theory." The Court held that under Rule 10b-5, a duty either to dis-
close information or abstain from trading arises only from a specific
fiduciary relationship or similar relationship of trust and confidence. 45
In the context of the classical theory, this means that a person cannot
be held liable for insider trading in a certain corporation's stock unless
the person owes a fiduciary duty to that corporation's shareholders.46
In other words, to be liable under the classical theory, a person must be
an insider or tippee of an insider of the traded corporation. 47 With this
principle in mind, the Chiarella Court reversed the conviction of an
employee of a financial printer who, while on the job, learned of sev-
eral upcoming mergers and subsequently bought stock in the target
corporations." Because the financial printer was hired by the acquiring
corporations rather than the targets, the employee owed no derivative
fiduciary duty to the shareholders of the target corporations.49 There-
41 Id. One should note, however, that the defendants in the case were officers, direc-
tors, and employees of the traded company, and therefore this broad language was proba-
bly dicta as applied to others. See id. at 839.
42 Id. at 848.
45 445 U.S. 222,235 (1980).
44 See id. at 228-29; see also 0]-Fagan, 521 U.S. at 652 (favorably discussing Chiarella);
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646,654-58 (1983) (favorably citing Chiarella).
45 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228-29.
46 See id.
47 See id. For example, if a CEO of a drug company learns of medical tests showing that
the company's flagship product causes severe cancer as a side-effect—a revelation that
would surely make the company's stock price fall upon public disclosure—the CEO must
either disclose that information to the company's shareholders or refrain from selling his
or her stuck in the company. See id. But if an outsider learns the same information—for
example, he sees a copy of the medical report that the CEO accidentally left on the sub-
way—the outsider is free to sell any stock he owns in the company without penalty because
he owes no fiduciary duty to the company's shareholders. See id. Furthermore, in this situa-
tion he is not a tippee of the CEO because the CEO only inadvertently imparted the in-
formation, without any intent to benefit from the disclosure. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662.
Typical "insiders" include persons such as officers and directors, and may also include
accountants, lawyers, consultants, and other people to whom the corporation divulges
information solely for business purposes. Id. at 655 n.14.
48 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224,232-33,237.
49 Id. at 232-33.
2006)	 The Personal Benefit Requirement in Insider Trading	 555
fore, the employee's trading in the targets' stock without disclosure of
the upcoming mergers to the targets' shareholders could not give rise
to insider trading liability under Rule 1013-5. 56
B. The Misappropriation Theory
In response to the Supreme Court's restriction of the scope of
the classical theory in Chiarella, the government began to prosecute
insider trading cases under an alternate theory: the misappropriation
theory. 51 The government posited that the specific fiduciary duty re-
quired by Chiarella could be one owed not only to a corporation's
shareholders, but also to a source of information. 52 Thus, the gov-
ernment asserted that a person who steals information and uses it for
trading purposes, in breach of a fiduciary duty to the information
source, also should be liable under section 10(b). 58 The Chiarella
Court had left open the issue of whether such a misappropriation
theory was viable. 54
On the one hand, several circuit courts agreed with the govern-
ment's position and adopted the misappropriation theory. 55 For in-
stance, in 1983, the Second Circuit in United States v. Newman affirmed
the 1013-5 insider trading convictions of employees of an investment
banking firm who misappropriated information from the firm for
trading purposes. 56 The employees conveyed the information to trad-
ers and shared the profits reaped from purchasing the stock of up-
coming merger targets. 57 The. court found the employees liable be-
cause they breached a fiduciary duty to the investment bank and the
bank's clients, from whom they stole the information. 58
so Id.
81 Randall W. Quinn, The Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading in the Supreme Court;
A (Brief) Response to the (Many) Critics of United States v. O'llagati, 8 FORDNAM J. CORP. &
FIN. L. 865,871 (2003).
55 Id.
88 Id,
84 011agan, 521 U.S. at 662. In his dissent in Chiarella, Chief Justice Burger advocated
the misappropriation theory as the proper basis for liability in that case. 445 U.S. at 240,
244-45 (Burger, J., dissenting).
85 See, e.g., SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2(1 403,410 (7th Cir. 1991); SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439,
453 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Newman, (164 F.2d 12,16-18 (2d Cir. 1981), affil, 722
F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1983).
88 Newman, 664 F.2d at 16.
57 Id. at 15.
58 Id. at 16-18.
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On the other hand, in 1995 the Fourth Circuit rejected the misap-
propriation theory in United States v. 13iyan. 59 The court reasoned that
the theory would hold misappropriators liable absent deception, de-
spite the fact that deception is a requirement for section 10(b)
ity.60 And even if the misappropriation theory did require deception,
the court reasoned, such deception would not occur "in connection
with" a purchase or sale of securities, as section 10(b) requires. 61 The
requisite connection did not exist, the court reasoned, because the per-
son deceived was an information source who did not necessarily have
some connection to, or some interest or stake in," a securities trade. 62
In 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. O'Hagan set-
tled this circuit split by explicitly adopting the misappropriation the-
ory. 65 Jatnes O'Hagan, a partner at a law firm, learned that one of his
firm's clients planned to make a tender offer for another company. 64
Prior to the public announcement of the offer, O'Hagan bought
significant quantities of the target company's stock and call options. 65
After the. public announcement, he sold them for a profit of more
than $4.3 million. 66 The trial court convicted O'Hagan of insider trad-
ing, money laundering, and mail fraud. 67
The Supreme Court upheld the insider trading conviction under
the misappropriation theory. 68 Justice Ginsburg, writing for the major-
ity, opined that a fiduciary who receives information from a principal
violates Rule 10b-5 when the fiduciary deceptively breaches a duty of
loyalty and confidentiality to the principal by (1) using the informa-
tion, without permission, to trade in securities, while (2) pretending
not to do so.68
The Court took pains to reject the criticisms raised by the Fourth
Circuit in Bryan and the Eighth Circuit in O'Hag-an.7° The Court em-
50 58 F.3d 933, 952 (4th Cir. 1995).
60 Id. at 949; see Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-76 (1977) (requiring
deception for Rule 10b-5 liability).
61 Bryan, 58 F.3d at 949-50.
62 Id. at 950.
63 See 521 U.S. at 650.
64 Id. at 648.
65 Id. at 647.
66 Id. at 648.
67
 a at 648-49.
66
 See 011agan, 521 U.S. at 650.
69 Id. at 652, 654.
70 See id. at 654-56; United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 620, 622 (8th Cir. 1996) (re-
jecting the misappropriation theory on the grounds that it fails the deception and "in
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phasized that under the misappropriation theory it was adopting, de-
ception of the information source, not merely a breach of duty owed
to the source, is required for liability." In this way, the Court rea-
soned, the misappropriation theory satisfies section I0(b)'s require-
ment of deception." Furthermore, the Court noted that this decep-
tion occurs "in connection with" a securities trade, as required by
section 10(b), because the deception and securities trade coincide."
They coincide because the fraud occurs when, without disclosure to
his or her principal, the misappropriator uses the information to
trade in securities.74 Thus, the Court reasoned, the theory is consis-
tent with the text of section 10(b). 75
The Court also indicated that it was deriving the scope of the
misappropriation theory from common-law principles of agency."
The Court referred to the information source as a "principal" multi-
ple times, and while discussing the requirements for misappropriator
liability, the Court cited to the Restatement (Second) of Agency.77 Thus,
the Court implied that courts should look to these agency principles
when clarifying gray areas in the future."
In summary, the misappropriation theory is a viable alternative to
the classical theory." While the classical theory applies to individuals
who breach a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of the traded corpo-
ration, the misappropriation theory applies to individuals who breach
a duty to the source of the information. 84
II. LIABILITY OF TIPPERS AND TIPPERS UNDER SECTION 10(8) AND
RULE 10B-5
A person can be held liable for insider trading under Rule 10b-5
even if that person does not personally trade in stock; courts and the
connection with" requirements of section 10(b)), real d, 521 U.S. 642 (1997); Bryan, 58 F.3d
at 949-50 (same).
71 See ()Hagan, 521 U.S. at 654-55.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 655-56.
74 Id. at 656.
75 Id. at 654-56.
75 See °Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653-56; Brief for Appellee at 40-4(1, SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d
1263 (11th Cir. 2003) (No. 01-14490); A.C. Pritchard, United States v. 01-lagari: Agency
Law and Justice Raven Legacy for the Law of Insider Trading, 8 B.U. L. REv. 13,47-48 (1998).
77 011ogan, 521 U.S. at 653-56.
78 See hi.
79 Id. at 650.
80 Id. at 651-53.
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SEC rules also permit liability under certain circumstances when a per-
son communicates information to another person who then trades. 81
The specific scope of tipper/tippee liability depends in part on whether
the case is brought under the classical or misappropriation theory. 82
A. Classical Theory
In 1983, in Dirks v. SEC, the U.S. Supreme Court established the
modern requirements for tipper/tippee liability under the classical
theory.83 Ronald Secrist, a former officer of an insurance company,
told Raymond Dirks, an investment analyst; that the insurance com-
pany was engaged in significant fraud." While investigating these al-
legations, Dirks revealed to some of his clients information about the
fraud that he obtained from the insurance company's employees. 85
Some of these clients then sold their stock in the insurance company
based on this information.86 Although Dirks's investigation induced
the public exposure of the insurance company's fraud, the SEC never-
theless censured Dirks for insider trading violations under Rule 10b-
5.87 On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit upheld the judgment against Dirks. 88
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the judgment against
Dirks.89 The Court held that where a tippee receives information from
a corporate insider, the tippee inherits the insider's duty either to dis-
close that information to the corporation's shareholders or to abstain
from trading and tipping only if two requirements are met: (1) the
insider breached a fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the
information to the tippee, and (2) the tippee knew, or should have
81 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 648, 660 (1983) (illustrating liability under the classical the-
ory of Rule 101-5); SEC v. Yuli, 327 F.3d 1263, 1269-70 (11di Cie 2003) (illustrating liabil-
ity under the misappropriation ilteory of Rule 101)-5).
82 See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-53 (1997) (explaining that the
fraud victim in misappropriation cases is the source of the information, as opposed to
classical cases where the fraud victim is a shareholder of the traded corporation). Compare
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662 (requiring a personal benefit to the tipper for tipper/tippee liability
in classical cases), with SEC v. Willis, 777 F. Supp. 1165, 1172 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (requiring
no personal benefit for tipper/tippee liability in misappropriation cases).
85 See 463 U.S. at 660, 662.
84 Id. at 649.
85 Id.
88 Id.
87 Id. at 650-52.
88 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 652.
89 Id.
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known, that such a breach occurred." The Court reasoned that a
breach of duty requirement is necessary, in part, to provide a "guiding
principle" for those market participants who wish to avoid insider
trading liability." Otherwise, the Court reasoned, potential defen-
dants would be unfairly forced, to rely on the reasonableness of the
SEC's litigation strategy."
The Court reasoned further that an insider's disclosure to a tip-
pee constitutes a breach of duty only when the insider makes the dis-
closure for an improper purpose." The purpose is improper, the
Court emphasized, only when the insider personally benefits from the
disclosure." Such a benefit can come in the form of a pecuniary gain,
reputational benefit, or benefits from making a gift to a relative or
friend." Deriving this personal benefit requirement from In re Cady,
Roberts C.9' Co., the Court justified the requirement by noting that a ma-
jor purpose of the Securities Exchange Act was to eliminate the idea
that corporate officers may treat inside information as part of their
compensation packages. 96 The Court acknowledged, however, that it
is not always easy to determine whether a corporate insider has gained
a personal benefit from the tip.97
Thus, the Court's first step in its analysis was to determine
whether Secrist and the other insurance company employees, the tip-
pers, breached a duty to the insurance company's shareholders by
disclosing information to Dirks, the tippee. 99 This turned on whether
Secrist and the other employees obtained a personal benefit from the
disclosures.99 The Court found that no such benefit existed. 1" The
Court emphasized that the tippers merely sought to expose fraud-
Secrist and the employees believed that disclosure to Dirks was the
best way to uncover the corporate wrongdoing because other efforts
99 Id. at 659-61.
91 Id. at 664.
92 Id. at 664 n.24 (suggesting that the SEC has sent mixed signals to the public regard-
ing who will be subject to its enforcement actions, and therefore legal limitations are nec-
essary).
"Disks, 463 U.S. at 662.
94 M.
95 Id. at 663-64.
96 Id. at 653 n.10, 662 (citing In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 n,15
(1961)).
97 Id. at 664.
98 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 665.
" Id. at 667.
I" Id.
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had "proved fruitless."'w Thus, the Court concluded that the tippers
breached no duty to the shareholders and consequently, Dirks could
not be held liable as a tippee. 102
The Court appeared to be particularly swayed by the public serv-
ice value of Secrist's and the other employees' disclosures.'m As Jus-
tice Blackmun pointed out in his dissent, "[dile Court justifies Se-
crist's and Dirks' action because the general benefit derived from the
violation of Secrist's duty to shareholders outweighed the harm
caused to those shareholders."'" The Court emphasized that the tip-
pers exposed fraud and therefore likely prevented corporate wrong-
doing from victimizing many more investors. 105 Furthermore, the
Court emphasized the need to protect tippers from liability for disclo-
sure to analysts, given that these analysts serve the important purpose
of collecting and analyzing information, as well as the fact that simul-
taneous disclosure to shareholders or the public is itnpracticable.m 6
The Court was unclear, however, as to whether the tipper must
intend to benefit personally or actually benefit personally. 107 In apply-
ing the Dirks benefit rule, circuit courts are likewise inconsistent.w8
Given that the Dirks Court appeared to place primary importance on
the tipper's motive, it seems that the Court probably intended an in-
tent-to-benefit test.'"
Although the government typically has no trouble proving the ex-
istence of a personal benefit, this is not always the case. 11° For instance,
in 2004 in SEC v. Maxwell, the U.S. District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Ohio found that the SEC produced insufficient evidence to es-
tablish that a corporate insider's disclosure to his barber created a per-
101 Id. at 667 & n.27.
1 °2 Id. at 667.
105
 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 652 n.8, 667 & n.27 (emphasizing the defendant's role in ex-
posing fraud); id. at 676-77 (131ackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court created the
personal benefit requirement in the first place because the general benefit derived from
the tips outweighed the harm caused to the corporation's shareholders).
104 Id. at 676-77 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
1 °5 See id. at 652 n.8, 667 & tt.27 (majority opinion) (emphasizing the defendant's role
in exposing fraud); id. at 676-77 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court created
the personal benefit requirement in the first place because the general benefit derived
from the tips outweighed the harm caused to the corporation's shareholders).
see See id. at 658-59 (majority opinion).
107 See id. at 662-63, 667.
108 Compare Yun, 327 F.3d at 1274-75 (applying an intent-to-benefit test), with SEC v.
Sargent, 229 F.3d 68, 77 (1st Gin 2000) (applying an actual-benefit test).
1(* See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662, 667.
11° Ebaugh, supra note 3, at 281 (noting the general ease of proof).
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sonal benefit." Similarly, in 1984, in SEC v. Szeitzer, the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma found that the SEC failed
to prove a personal benefit." 2 In that case, the tipper was a corporate
insider who disclosed business information to his wife while observing a
track meet." 8 The disclosure was overheard by the tippee, Switzer, who
was sunbathing behind the couple. 114 Because the tipper made the dis-
closure merely for the purpose of informing his wife of his schedule
and making childcare arrangements, and thus only inadvertently im-
parted the information to the tippee, the court concluded that the tip-
per did not personally benefit from the disclosure. 115
Thus, in summary, under the classical theory, a tipper and a trad-
ing tippee are both liable for insider trading when, without disclosing
the information to the shareholders of the traded corporation, the
tipper breaches a fiduciary duty to the shareholders by conveying the
information to the tippee to obtain a personal benefit, and the tippee
knows, or should know, that the breach occurred. 116
B. Misappropriation Theory
In addition to classical cases, courts have applied tipper/tippee
liability in misappropriation cases. 117 In this context, the tippee inher-
its the tipper's duty to disclose or abstain from trading when the tip-
per breaches a fiduciary duty to the source of the information and the
tippee knows, or has reason to know, that the tipper has breached that
duty." 8 Unlike tipper/tippet liability in the context of the classical
theory, however, courts are divided as to whether a personal benefit to
the tipper is required for liability in misappropriation cases." 8
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed this issue. 12° In Dirks,
the Supreme Court required a personal benefit in a case brought un-
der the classical theory, before the Supreme Court had endorsed the
Ill 341 F. Stipp. 2d 941, 948 (S.D. Ohio 2004).
112 590 F. Supp. 756, 766 (W.D. Okla. 1984).
113 Id. at 761, 766.
114 Id. at 762.
113 Id. at 766.
116 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659-62.
117 See Yun, 327 F.3d at 1269-70; United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 600 (2d Cir.
1993); Willis, 777 F. Stipp. at 1169.
116 See Yun, 327 F.3d at 1269-70; Libera, 989 F.2d at 600; Willis, 777 F. Stipp. at. 1169.
176 Compare Yun, 327 F.3d at 1275 (requiring a personal benefit), with Willis, 777 F.
Supp. at 1172 11.7 (requiring no personal benefit).
126 See Sargent, 229 , F.3d at 77 (noting disagreement among lower courts).
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misappropriation theory. 121 Nor did the Supreme Court decide the
issue when it adopted the misappropriation theory in 071agan, be-
cause 07-lagan was not a tipper/tippee case; the misappropriator in
071agan personally traded on the stolen information. 122
On the one hand, some courts explicitly or implicitly reject the
personal benefit requirement for misappropriation cases. 125 For in-
stance, in 1991 in SEC v. Willis, the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York explicitly noted in dicta that the misappropriation
theory does not require a showing of a benefit to the tipper. 21 4 Th e
court reached the same conclusion in 1989 in SEC v. Musella. 125
Similarly, in 1993 in United States v. Libera, the Second Circuit im-
plied that it would not require a personal benefit in misappropriation
cases. 126 In that case, the court affirmed the defendants' convictions
for insider trading and stated:
[T]he misappropriation theory requires the establishment of
two elements: (i) a breach by the tipper of a duty owed to the
owner of the nonpublic information; and (ii) the tippee's
knowledge that the tipper had breached the duty. We believe
these two elements, without more, are sufficient for tippee li-
ability.' 27
As the First Circuit observed in its 2000 decision in SEC v. Sargent, the
Second Circuit's failure to mention a personal benefit in Libera strongly
suggests that the Second Circuit would not require such a benefit for
tipper/tippee liability.' 28
On the other hand, some courts do require a personal benefit for
misappropriation cases, and several authors have argued in favor of
this approach. 129 At least one author has reasoned that the personal
12 ' See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662; see also O'llagan, 521 U.S. at 650 (adopting the misappro-
priation theory in 1997, fourteen years after Dirks was decided).
122 See Oflagan, 521 U.S. at 647-48.
123 See, e.g., Libera, 989 F.2d at 600; Willis, 777 F. Supp. at (172 n.7; SEC v. Musella, 748
F. Supp. 1028, 1038 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 898 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1990).
124 See 777 F. Supp. at 1172 n.7.
123 See 748 F. Supp. at 1038 n.4.
126 See Libera, 989 E2d at 600.
12/ Id.
in Sawa', 229 F.3d at 77; see Libera, 989 F.2d at 600.
129 See, e.g., Yun, 327 F.3d at 1275; SEC v. Gonzalez de Castilla, 184 F. Stipp. 2d 365, 375
(S.D.N.Y. 2002); SEC v. Blackman, No. 3:99-1072, 2000 WE 868770, at *6-8 (M.D. Tenn.
May 26, 2000); Stevens v. O'Brien Envti. Energy, Inc., [1999 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCU) 90,475, at 92,242 (E.D. Pa. May 10, 1999); SEC v. Trikilis, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CC14) ¶ 97,015, at 97,462 (C.1). Cal. July 28, 1992), vacated on other grounds, [1992-1993
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benefit requirement is needed to further the Dirks policy of protecting
tippers from liability in the case of inadvertent or fraud-exposing dis-
closures.'" For instance, disclosures exposing fraud arguably promote
the misappropriation theory's goal of protecting the integrity of the
securities market."'
Some authors and at least one court have reasoned that a per-
sonal benefit should be required in misappropriation cases because
the benefit is already required in classical cases, and courts should try
to make the classical and misappropriation theories as similar as pos-
sible."2 In 2003 in SEC v. Yun, the Eleventh Circuit employed this rea-
soning when it held that in misappropriation cases, the tipper and
tippee are not liable unless the tipper seeks to benefit from the tip. I"
In support of its opinion that a personal benefit should be re-
quired in misappropriation cases, the Yun court first noted the need
to develop consistency in insider trading case law."4 In addition, the
court emphasized the similarity of the tippeeis and tipper's positions
under both theories. 185 The tippee is on notice under both theories
that the tippee received confidential information through a breach of
.duty, and the choice of theory makes no difference as to potential Ii-
ability or harm to investors if the tippee trades on the information. 186
In addition, the tipper breaches a duty under both theories and the
resulting harm to the marketplace is the same.'" Based on these simi-
larities, the Yun court concluded that it would be nonsensical to treat
a tipper or tippee differently under the misappropriation theory as
compared to the classical theory."8
The Yun court also advanced a more pragmatic reason for its goal
of synthesis. The Yun court reasoned that separating the two theories
would permit the SEC, and courts hearing misappropriation cases, to
Transfer Binder' Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (Cal) 1 97,375, at 95,981 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 1993);
Ebaugh, supra note 3, at 288-93; Davis, supra note 3, at 291-97; Plotkin, supra note 3, at 5.
130 See Ebaugh, supra note 3, at 288-93.
131 See id. at 292.
132 See Yun, 327 F.3(1 at 1275-77; Davis, supra note 3, at 294; Plotkin, supra note 3, at 5.
Pm 327 F.3d at 1275-77. The Yun court did not address whether a personal benefit is
requited in cases brought tinder Rule 14e-3 because the case before it did not involve in-
formation about a tender often See id. at 1267-68 (describing the material, nonpublic in-
formation at issue, which related to the traded corporation's unfavorable earnings); 17
C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2005) (applying only to information regarding a tender offer).
134 Yun, 327 F.3d at 1276.
133 Id. at 1276-77.
1311
	 at 1276.
137 Id. at 1277.
Pm Id. at 1276-77.
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ignore precedent under the classical theory whenever they saw fit. 139
Because virtually all violations under the classical theory would also be
violations under the misappropriation theory, the court reasoned, fail-
ing to synthesize the theories would provide the government with am-
ple opportunity to exploit the looser misappropriation standards by
trying all cases under the misappropriation theory. 14° In the context of
the personal benefit requirement, the court opined, such a tactic would
unacceptably render the Supreme Court's decision in Dirks a "dead let-
ter. "141
Aside from its synthesis rationale, the Yun court also advanced
more technical reasons for imposing the personal benefit require-
ment in misappropriation cases. 142 For instance, the court reasoned
that requiring a personal benefit is necessary to ensure that liability
arises only if the tipper engages in deception in connection with a se-
curities trade, not merely a breach of duty, 143 Without the personal
benefit test, the court reasoned, a tipper could be liable even where
the tipper does not intend that the disclosure will result in a trade. 144
Furthermore, the Yun court reasoned, requiring a personal
benefit is supported by language in ()Ragan, because in that case the
Supreme Court either "explicitly statefd] or implicitly assume[d]" a
personal benefit requirement for misappropriation cases. 145 For in-
stance, the Yun court noted O'Hagan's assertion that in misappropria-
tion cases, a breach of duty occurs through a fiduciary's "`self-serving
use of a principal's information to purchase or sell securities," and that
one who "'pretends loyalty to the principal while secretly converting
the principal's information for personal gain dupes or defrauds the
principal. "'146 The Yun court reasoned that, because a personal
benefit is required for liability of misappropriators who personally
trade, as evidenced by this language in O'Hagan, it would be "absurd"
not to require it for tippers as well, since omitting the requirement
would have the effect of holding tippers liable more readily than the
traders. 147
199
 Van, 327 F.3d at 1275-76,1279.
140
 Id. at 1279.
In Id.
142 See id. at 1278-79.
143 Id. at 1278 & n.33.
144 Yun, 327 F.3d at 1278 & n.34.
145
 Id. at 1279.
146 Id. (quoting O'llagan, 521 U.S. at 652-54).
147
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Finally, sonic courts have merely applied the personal benefit
test, but failed to explain why the requirement should apply to misap-
propriation cases. 148 For instance, in 2000 in SEC v. Blackman, the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee stated in a misap-
propriation case that Dirks required the tipper to receive some benefit
to hold the tippee liable. 149 The court did not expound, however, on
why the Dirks personal benefit test necessarily applies to misappropria-
tion cases.'"
III. REVISING TIIE PERSONAL BENEFIT REQUIREMENT IN
MISAPPROPRIATION CASES
The personal benefit requirement for insider trading violations is
flawed because it protects tippers to a much greater extent than is
supported by its underlying policy rationale. 151 For this reason, courts
should decline to extend the requirement to the misappropriation
theory, and should instead apply a revised requirement that better
promotes the policies underlying the theory. 152 To do this, courts fac-
ing tipper/tippee misappropriation cases should require that (1) the
tipper was at least reckless as to whether he or she would either benefit
personally or harm the information source by tipping, and (2) the
tipper was at least reckless as to whether someone in the line of tip-
pees would use the information to trade. 153 This standard should be
subject only to the tipper's defense that the tipper made the disclosure
in a good faith attempt to prevent criminal activity reasonably certain
to cause substantial physical or financial harm to others.'"
A. Quarantining the Personal Benefit Requirement
The personal benefit requirement is flawed because it protects
tippers from liability to a much greater extent than its underlying pol-
icy rationale can support. 155 Because of this flaw, and because courts
148 See, e.g Gonzalez de Castilla, 184 F. Supp. 2d at 375; Blackman, 2000 WL 868770, at
*6-8.
147 Blackman, '2000 WL 868770, at *6.
150 See id.
151 See infra notes 155-183 and accompanying text.
152 See infra notes 155-183 and accompanying text.
155 See infra notes 189-270 and accompanying text.
154 See infra notes 184-270 and accompanying text..
155 See SEC v. Maxwell, 341 F. Supp. 2d 941,994-50 (S.D. Ohio 2004) (exculpating a
tipper and tippee where the tippee used the information selfishly, thus demonstrating how
the personal benefit requirement can protect tippers and tippees who produce no social
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are not bound to extend the requirement to the misappropriation
theory under existing Supreme Court precedent, courts should
confine the requirement to the classical theory of insider trading. 156
The Court articulated the underlying policy rationales in 1983 in
Dirks v. SEC, when the Supreme Court held that tipper/tippee liability
cannot arise unless the tipper intends to benefit personally from the
tip)" The Court appeared to be particularly swayed by the public
service value of the insider-tippers' disclosures to the analyst-tippee,
who subsequently exposed the corporation's wrongdoing and also
induced his clients to sell their stock. 158
 Instead of placing importance
on the fact that the tippers' selective disclosures resulted in sales that
caused harm to the oblivious purchasers whose share values subse-
quently plummeted, the Court emphasized the tippers' efforts to ex-
pose fraud and the important role analysts play in the marketplace.' 59
With these concerns in mind, the Court created a blanket require-
ment under the classical theory that the tipper intend to benefit per-
sonally in providing the tip. 160
Unfortunately, it seems that these policy concerns do not justify a
blanket personal benefit requirement. 161 It is first important to note
benefit to offiet the harm they cause to investor confidence); Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R.
§ 243.100-.103 (2005) (fOrbidding selective disclosure to analysts); Selective Disclosure .
and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,716-18 (Aug. 24, 2000) (adopting Regulation
FD and discussing the need for prohibition of selective disclosure to analysts); Selective
Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,592-93 (proposed Dec. 28, 1999)
(discussing the need for prohibition of selective disclosure to analysts); Donald C.
Langevoort, investment Analysts and the Law of Insider Trading, 76 VA. L. REV. 1023, 1044-45
(1990) (critiquing arguments in favor of selective disclosure to analysts).
'56 See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 650 (1997) (adopting the misappropria-
tion theory without addressing tipper/tippec liability); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662
(1983) (adopting a personal benefit requirement in cases brought under the classical the-
ory).
157 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 652 n.8, 658-59, 667 & 11.27.
155 See id.
159 See id. at 667 11.27 (asserting that the harm to shareholders from the ultimate tip-
pees' trades is of little legal significance and noting that the tippers' disclosures prevented
the victimization of many more investors).
160 See id. at 652 n.8, 658-59, 662, 667 & n.27.
161 See Maxwell, 341 F. Stipp. 2d at 944-50 (exculpating a tipper for disclosure to a self-
serving non-analyst tippee due to a lack of a personal benefit to the tipper, thus demon-
strating how the personal benefit requirement can protect tippers and tippees who pro-
duce no societal benefit to offset the harm caused to investor confidence); Regulation FD,
17 C.F.R. § 243.100-.103 (2005) (forbidding selective disclosure to analysts, thus demon-
strating that selective disclosures such as tips, especially those made to analysts, harm inves-
tor confidence); Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,716-18
(Aug. 24, 2000) (adopting Regulation FD and discussing the need for prohibition of selec-
tive disclosure to analysts); Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590,
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that tipping gives a distinct informational advantage to a few inves-
tors—in the case of disclosures to analysts, the analysts' clients—who
are likely to use the information to trade. 162 This trading is in turn
likely to affect adversely the confidence of investors who lack such
preferential access to information from corporate insiders. 163 For this
reason, tipping that is likely to result in trading should only be per-
mitted when other important legal or policy considerations are strong
enough to outweigh this resulting harm. 164
With this point in mind, the personal benefit requirement is overly
broad because it protects tippers and tippers in several instances where
the benefits of the disclosure do not outweigh the harm. 166 For in-
stance, selective disclosures to analysts in particular do more harm than
gooc1. 166 Such disclosures can create an incentive for analysts to skew
their recommendations in favor of the issuer, in hopes of continued
preferential access to information. 167 Corporate insiders might even
delay public announcements in order to improve their relationships
with analysts through selective disclosure.' For these very reasons, in
2000 the SEC promulgated Regulation FD, which provides that when
an issuer discloses material, nonpublic information to an analyst, it
must also disclose that information to the public. 169
In addition, even if the personal benefit requirement could be
justified in the case of disclosures to analysts in particular, the per-
sonal benefit requirement would still be overly broad because it also
72,592-93 (proposed Dec. 28, 1999) (discussing the need for prohibition of selective dis-
closure to analysts); Langevoort, supra note .155, at 1044-45 (critiquing arguments for
selective disclosure to analysts).
162 See. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,592 n.15 (citing
Richard Frankel et al., An Empirical Examination of Conference Calls as a Voluntary Disclosure
Medium, 37 J. ACCT. RES. 133 (1999) (indicating that selective disclosure to analysts allows
certain individuals to profit from trading before the information is announced publicly)).
163 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,716 (adopting
Regulation FD).
1" See id.
165 See Maxwell, 341 F. Stipp. 2d at 944-50; 17 C.F.R. § 243.100—.103; Selective Disclo-
sure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,716-18 (adopting Regulation FD); Selective
Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,592-93; Langevoort, supra note 155, at
1044-45.
16" See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,592-93; Langevoort,
supra note 155, at 1044-45.
167 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,592-93 (proposed
Dec. 28, 1999); Langevoort, supra note 155, at 1041-42.
168 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,592.
169 17 C.F.R. § 243.100—.103 (2005).
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protects disclosures to self-serving non-analysts. 170 Arguably, disclo-
sures to analysts could be justified because analysts serve the com-
mendable purpose of gathering and analyzing information for others'
benefit."' The personal benefit requirement, however, also protects
disclosures to self-serving tippers who will use the information solely
for their own benefit by trading. 172 For instance, in 2004 in SEC v.
Maxwell, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio
found that the SEC produced insufficient evidence to establish that a
corporate insider's disclosure to his barber, who personally traded,
created a personal benefit.'" Rather than gathering and analyzing
information for the benefit of the marketplace, the barber-tippee self-
servingly used the information to trade, reaping almost $200,000 in
profits. 174 Yet, because the tipper did not benefit personally, the bar-
ber-tippee escaped liability. 175
 Thus, even if the personal benefit re-
quirement could be justified in the narrow situation of analysts, the
Dirks Court launched "a missile to kill a mouse" by creating a blanket
personal benefit requirement.I 76
The personal benefit requirement also protects many tippers who
purposefully, knowingly, or recklessly harm others through their dis-
closures. 1 " For instance, the requirement appears to protect tippers
who tip in order to cause harm to someone.'" Furthermore, even if
the personal benefit requirement held liable those whose purpose is to
cause harm, by treating the satisfaction of causing harm as a type of
personal benefit, the requirement would still fail to hold liable those
who cause the harm merely knowingly or recklessly, such as a corpo-
rate insider who becomes drunk at a bar and begins to disclose in-
17° See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662.
171 See id. at 658-59 (discussing analysts' useful public purpose).
172 See id. at 662; Maxwell, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 944-50 (employing the personal benefit
requirement to exculpate tipper of tippee who merely used the information to trade per-
sonally).
173 341 F. Supp. 2d at 948.
174 Id. at 944-45.
175 Id. at 950.
173 Cf. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1036 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) (stating in a takings case that "today the Court launches a missile to kill a mouse" by
improperly "issuing sweeping new rules to decide such a narrow case").
177 See Dints, 463 U.S. at 662; SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1278 n.34 (11th Cir. 2003);
Richard W. Painter et al., Don't Ask, Just Tell: Insider Trading After United States v. O'llagan,
84 VA. L. REV. 153, 194 (1998).
173 See Yun, 327 F.3d at 1278 11.34 (stating that if a CEO's wife disclosed information
solely to humiliate her husband, she would not intend "that anyone would ... benefit" but
rather would "merely" want to harm her husband, thus implying that a personal benefit
requirement would protect such a wife from tipper liability).
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formation inappropriately without expecting anything, in return, or
the Vice President in the opening hypothetical of this Note who indif-
ferently discusses a confidential tender offer with his barber)" Unlike
whistleblowers or analysts, these tippers produce no public benefit to
counteract the harm they cause to investors)" Thus, in protecting
these tippers, the personal benefit requirement is far broader than
can be justified by its motivating policy concerns. 181
The aforementioned flaws in the blanket personal benefit re-
quirement suggest that although lower courts unfortunately must apply
the requirement in classical cases, they should decline to extend the re-
quirement to the misappropriation theory.' 82 Instead, courts should ex-
amine the misappropriation theory to determine what standard would
best promote the text and purposes of section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act and Rule 101)-5 as interpreted by Supreme Court prece-
dent, as well as the policies underlying our federal securities laws.iNs
B. A Revised Personal Benefit Requirement for Misappropriation Cases
Instead of requiring a personal benefit in misappropriation cases,
courts should require that (1) the tipper was at least reckless as to
whether he or she would eitherbenefit personally or harm the informa-
tion source by tipping, and (2) the tipper was at least reckless as to
whether someone in the line of tippees would use the information to
trade)" This standard should be subject only to the tipper's defense
that the tipper made the disclosure in a good faith attempt to prevent
criminal activity reasonably certain to cause substantial physical or
1" See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662 (Focusing on the purpose of the disclosure in creating the
personal benefit requirement); Painter et al., supra note 177, at 194 (noting that under the
Dirks personal benefit test, a tipper who becomes drunk at a bar and discusses confidential
information without expecting anything in return would escape section 10(b) liability);
supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
18° See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 676-77 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court cre-
ated the personal benefit requirement because the "general benefit" derived from the tips
outweighed the harm caused to the corporation's shareholders); Selective Disclosure and
Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000) (adopting Regulation FD and
noting that trades flowing from selective disclosure cause harm to investor confidence).
uo See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 676-77 (Blackmun,'., dissenting); Selective Disclosure and In-
sider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,716 (adopting Regulation FD).
LAS See supra notes 158-181 and accompanying text.
153 See supra notes 158-181 and accompanying text.
1" See Onagan, 521 U.S. at 653, 658-59; Dirks, 4113 U.S. at 652 n.8, 667 Sc 11.27; Espio-
nage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000); Brief for Appellee, .supra note 713, at 40-46; RrsTATF.-
MENT crwito OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 cmt. c (1995); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 395 CMt. a (1958).
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financial harm to others.' 85
 This approach not only comports with
Supreme Court precedent in a technical sense, but also best promotes
the important Court-identified policies of promoting investor
confidence while, at the same time, protecting tippers who seek to
expose criminal and harmful activity. 186
1. The Proposed Standard Expounded
First, the proposed standard establishes recklessness as the mini-
mum mental state the tipper must possess regarding the resulting per-
sonal benefit or harm to the information source, as well as the ultimate
securities trade. 187 Courts should adopt the Model Penal Code's
definition of recklessness, which has become widely accepted by courts
today. 188 Under the Model Penal Code, a person acts recklessly if he
"consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the ma-
terial element exists or will result from his conduct." 189 Thus, under the
proposed standard, the relevant inquiry would be whether the tipper
consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that he or
she would benefit personally or harm the information source, as well as
a risk that he would cause a securities trade. 19°
Courts should look to all relevant circumstances in determining
whether these elements of the proposed standard are met. 191 In the
case of a personal benefit, courts should look for the types of personal
benefits that Dirks suggested: pecuniary gain, reputational benefit, or
benefits from making a gift to a relative or friend. 192 As Dirks suggested,
a tipper's expectation that these will result could be inferred from a
185 See 18 U.S.C. § 794(a); 071agan, 521 U.S. at 653, 658-59; Dirks, 463 U.S. at 652 n.8,
667 & n.27; Brief for Appellee, supra note 76, at 40-46; RESTATEMENT (TIORD) or UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 40 Ma. c (1995); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 cunt. a (1958).
186 See 07Iagan, 521 U.S. at 653, 658-59 (emphasizing investor confidence); Dirks, 463
U.S. at 652 n.8, 667 & n.27 (emphasizing the defendant's role in exposing fraud).
187 See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
188 See josnuA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 10.07 [B] [31 [a], at 140 (3d
ed. 2001).
189 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1985). A risk is "substantial and unjustifiable"
when "considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances
known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a
law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation." Id.
190 Id.
191 Cf. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390-91 n.30 (1983) (noting
that scienter in fraud cases can be inferred from circumstantial evidence).
192 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663-64.
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relationship between the insider and the recipient that suggests a quid
pro quo, or an intention to benefit the recipient of the information. 193
With regard to harming the information source, courts should
consider whether there is evidence that the tipper possessed negative
feelings towards the source of the information, as well as whether the
information source had expressed to the tipper a strong desire for the
information to remain confidential)" Such facts would suggest that the
tipper disclosed the information with some expectation that it would
cause harm. 19° Finally, regarding the question of whether someone in
the line of tippees would trade, courts should consider whether the
tipper knew about the tippee's interest in trading in the type of stock to
which the disclosure pertained, any seemingly reliable assurances made
by the tippee about trading or tipping others, and the tipper's knowl-
edge of the trading value of the information.i 16
Under the proposed standard, the tipper and tippee would not
be liable, however, if the tipper made the disclosure in a good faith
attempt to prevent criminal activity reasonably certain to cause sub-
stantial physical or financial harm to others. 197 Thus, tippers who
make disclosures to expose a corporation's criminal fraud that is rea-
sonably certain to cause substantial harm to investors or any other
person or entity doing business with the company in the future, as the
tippers in Dirks did, would not be liable for insider trading. 198 This
would be true even if the disclosures were also likely to produce a per-
sonal benefit, such as an enhanced reputation, or harm the informa-
tion source by exposing it to criminal liability or bankruptcy. 190
Thus, in the hypothetical in the Introduction of this Note, the
Vice President-tipper and the barber-tippee would both be liable for
insider trading. 2" First, the Vice President consciously disregarded a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that his disclosure would harm Acme
I9!
	 at 664.
194 See Von., 327 F.3d at 1278 n.34 (describing a wife who discloses information to a
newspaper editor in order to humiliate her husband).
195 See id.
196 See Maxwell, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 944 (exculpating a tipper and tippee and describing
facts that, under the proposed standard, would likely give rise to an inference that the
insider-tipper disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the barber-tippee would
trade).
1" See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 667 (exculpating the defendant-tippee and emphasizing that
the tippers' purpose was to expose corporate fraud).
190
	 id.
199 See id. at 650 (exculpating defendants despite the fact t hat. their exposure of the
corporation's fraud caused the corrupt corporation to plummet into receivership).
21)(1 See Wpm, PE Nt m. Cony § 2.02(2) (c) (1985); supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
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Corporation, the source of the information. 2°' He knew that leaking
information about an upcoming acquisition would create a substantial
risk that the acquisition would fall apart. 202 In addition, he had
sufficient notice that the barber would tip his friends and that their
group would collectively buy stock in Zen Corporation and even tip
others, all of which would likely alert the public to the upcoming ac-
quisition and consequently frustrate Acme Corporation's attempt to
expand its business." Thus, he was reckless as to whether his disclo-
sure would harm the information source. 2°4 For this reason, under the
proposed standard it would not matter that the Vice President sought
no personal benefit in making the disclosure."
In addition, the Vice President-tipper disregarded a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that his disclosure would cause the barber-
tippee to trade." He knew that the barber and the barber's friends
enjoyed finding and investing in acquisition targets. 2°7 He also be-
lieved the barber was probing for information because every time he
visited the barber previously, the barber had suspiciously asked
whether Acme Corporation would acquire other companies soon."
The Vice President also knew the high trading value of the informa-
tion." Yet, the Vice President still made the disclosure. 210 Thus, the
Vice President was also reckless as to whether someone in the line of
tippees would use the information provided by him to trade. 2"
201 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (c) (1985); supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
202 Supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
295 See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
204 See Moira, PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1985); supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
295 See supra notes 184-199 and accompanying text. Although one might try to argue
that the Vice President sought the "benefit" of speaking freely, this benefit is likely too
trivial to give rise to liability. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663-64 (identifying personal benefits of
consequence, such as a pecuniary gain, enhanced reputation, or satisfaction of making a
valuable gift to a relative or friend); Maxwell, 341 F. Stipp. 2d at 948 (holding that there was
no personal benefit where the tipper-insider tipped his barber because "Dirks requires an
intended benefit of at least some consequence" and there was no evidence that the tipper-
executive sought money, a reputational gain, or the satisfaction of giving a gift to the bar-
ber); SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Stipp. 756, 766 (W.D. Okla. 1984) (holding that there was no
personal benefit where a father-tipper made the disclosure for the purpose of making
child care arrangements).
206 See MODEL PENAL Cone § 2.02(2)(c) (1985); supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
207 Supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
20I3 Supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
209 Supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
210 *Oa notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
211 See Monet. PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (c) (1985); supra notes 1-3 and accompanying
text.
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Moreover, the Vice President did not make the disclosure in a
good faith attempt to prevent criminal activity reasonably certain to
cause substantial physical or financial harm to others.212 Rather, he
made his disclosure because of his indifference to the disclosure's
consequences. 213 In fact, Acme Corporation was not engaged in any
wrongdoing that would prompt the Vice President to disclose. 214
Filially, the barber would be liable as a trading tippee because he
knew, or should have known, that the Vice President passed on infor-
mation in breach of a duty to Acme Corporation. 215 The barber knew
that the Vice President worked for Acme Corporation and therefore, in
all likelihood, was forbidden to discuss the upcoming tender offer. 216
2. Fully Protecting Investors from Trades Based on Misappropriated
Information
When the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the misappropriation the-
ory in 1997 in United States v. °Hagan, it made clear that the purpose of
the theory is to ensure honest securities markets and thereby promote
investor confidence. 217 Investors will lose confidence in a market where
many trades are the fruit of misuse of information. 218 For that reason,
the proposed standard reaches both possible misuses of information in
connection with securities trades: conversion for a personal benefit,
and use to the detriment of the information source. 219 For the same
reason, the proposed standard also holds liable tippers who cause such
trades recklessly, albeit not purposefully or knowingly. 220
a. Reaching Both Mies of Misuse
An examination of other areas of law involving misuse of infor-
mation reveals that improperly using information for one's own
benefit is only one type of misuse; harming the source of the informa-
212 See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
213 Supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
214 See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
215 See United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596,600 (2(1 Cir. 1993); SEC v. Willis, 777 F.
Supp. 1165,1169 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
216 See Littera, 989 F.2d at 600; Willis, 777 F. Supp. at 1169; supra notes 1-3 and accom-
panying text.
2" 071agrt, 521 U.S. at 653.
218
 hi. at 658-59.
219 See id.
220 See id.
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tion is another. 221
 Perhaps the most important area of law in this re-
gard is the law of agency because in O'Hagan the Supreme Court itself
implied that agency principles were at the misappropriation theory's
core.222 The Court not only cited to the Restatement (Second) of Agency,
but also employed standard agency language when describing the
participants in misappropriation. 228 For instance, the Court referred
to the information source as a "principal" multiple times. 224 Under
these agency principles, an agent is legally obligated not to communi-
cate information to the detriment of the principal. 225 Thus; it seems
that O'Hagan strongly implied that harming the information source
constitutes the type of misuse that, when connected to securities trad-
ing, the misappropriation theory ought to proscribe. 226
One need not rely solely on agency law, however, because other
areas of law also demonstrate the gravity of misappropriation,
through disclosure, of information to the detriment of the owner. 227
For instance, under the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, one
may be liable in some circumstances for disclosing a trade secret not
only when disclosure is made for purposes of personal commercial
exploitation, but also when disclosure is made for the purpose of
causing harm . to the trade secret owner. 228 The same idea applies in
the law of espionage; a spy violates the Espionage Act when he dis-
closes national defense secrets with intent or reason to believe that
221 See Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000); Brief for Appellee, supra note 76, at 45;
RESTATEMENT (T/IIHD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 crra. c (1995); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 395 cunt. a (1958).
222 See Wilagan, 521 U.S. at 652-54 (employing agency terminology and citing to the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY); Brief for Appellee, supra note 76, at 42-43 (arguing
that agency principles instruct the scope of the misappropriation theory); Pritchard, supra
note 76, at 47 (stating that the misappropriation theory is "well grounded" in the common
law of agency).
225 0 'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652-54.
224 Id.
225 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 cmt. a (1958).
226 See Oliagan, 521 U.S. at 652-54, 658-59; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395
clan. a (1958). The SEC made this very agency argument, unsuccessfully, in Yun. See 327
F.3d 1263,1275 (rejecting SEC's attempt to avoid a personal benefit requirement); Brief
for Appellee, supra note 76, at 40-46 (arguing that no personal benefit should be required
because, tinder the agency principles to which °Nagai! alluded, a tipper breaches a duty
to the information source not only when the tipper benefits from the disclosure, but also
when the disclosure harms the source).
227 See Espionage Act, t8 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000); RESTATEMENT (TIMID) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 40 cult. c (1995).
228 RESTATEMENT' (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 crrit. c (1995).
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the information will be used to the detriment of the United States. 229
The Espionage Act does not require a personal benefit to the thief. 23°
Together, these areas of law indicate that disclosure of informa-
tion to the detriment of the information owner is equally as grave as
disclosure of information for the misappropriator's own benefit. 231
When this misuse of information results in securities trades, the harm
to investors is the same in either case; as the Supreme Court in
O'Hagan made clear, investors will hesitate to invest because they will
suspect that those with whom they trade may have gained their infor-
mational advantages by means the investor cannot legally match
through skill or diligence. 232
For this reason, the Eleventh Circuit's assertion in SEC v. Yun that
O'Hagan "explicitly states or implicitly assumes" that a misappropria-
tor must obtain a personal benefit is mistaken. 233 Rather, O'Hagan's
emphasis on the harm caused by trades that result from misappro-
priation demonstrates that the Court's occasional descriptions of a
misappropriator seeking personal gain are more properly seen as
reflections of the facts before the Court in which the misappropriator
did trade for personal benefit. 234
The proposed standard's adherence to the misappropriation
theory's underlying policy rationale justifies its modest departure
from the requirements of tipper/tippee liability under the classical
theory. 235 For this reason, the Yun court's assertion that a personal
benefit requirement is proper in order to synthesize the misappro-
priation theory with the classical theory is also mistaken.236 The Yun
court failed to consider that the flaws of the personal benefit re-
quirement themselves are good reason not to impose it on the misap-
229 18 U.S.C. § 794(a). A person also violates the Act when he discloses the information
with intent or reason to believe that it will be used to the advantage of a foreign nation. Id.
220 See id.
221 See id.; ()'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652-54, 658-59; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 40 cmt. c (1995); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 ant. a (1958).
292 See ()'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652-54. ,
2" See Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000); O'llagan, 521 U.S. at 652-54, 658-59;
Yun, 327 F.3d at 1279; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 ant. c (1995);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 cm t. a (1958).
224 See 18 U.S.C. § 794(a); ()Hagan, 521 U.S. at 647-48, 652-54, 658-59; Brief for Ap-
pellee, supra note 76, at 44; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 ant. c
(1995); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 cmt. a (1958).
295 See 18 U.S.C. § 794(a); ()Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652-54, 658-59; RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 ant. c (1995); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395
cmt. a (1958).
220 See Yun, 327 F.3d at 1275-77.
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propriation theory. 257 In addition, the Yun court displayed unwar-
ranted concern about the possibility that failing to require a personal
benefit would render Dirks a "dead letter" by inducing government
prosecutors to try more cases under the misappropriation theory. 238 It
is unclear why it would be objectionable for government prosecutors
to pursue a valid theory that is harmonized with law and policy merely
because there happens to be an alternate theory the government
cannot satisfy in that particular case. 2" Where a defendant has vio-
lated either theory, he or she has violated Rule 10b-5, and therefore
should be subject to an enforcement action. 24° Thus, in summary, re-
quiring either a personal benefit or harm to the information source
best promotes the policies emphasized by O'Hagan.241
b. Reaching Reckless Tippers
O'Hagan's emphasis on protecting investors also suggests that
tippers with a reckless state of mind should not escape liability merely
because they did not hope, or know for certain, that their conduct
would cause the resulting harm. 242 This is especially true given that
recklessness is no stranger to either insider trading law or other areas
of criminal law; it is a common standard for liability. 243
Insider trading law already embraces the recklessness standard. 244
For instance, recklessness is sufficient to establish the requisite scien-
ter, or intent to deceive. 245 Criminal law in general also embraces
recklessness.246
 For instance, the influential Model Penal Code states
that if the legislature fails to specify what state of mind is required for
237 See id.
238 See id. at 1279.
2" See O'llagan, 521 U.S. at 665 (validating the misappropriation theory as consistent
with section 10(b) and Supreme Court precedent).
240 See id.
24 ' See Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000); O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652-54, 658-59,
665; RESTATEMENT (rf with) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 (wit. c (1995); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 cult. a (1958).
242 See OlIagan, 521 U.S. at 658-59.
243 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (1985) (setting recklessness as the default where
the legislature fails to specify a wens rea, or level of intent, for an element of an offense);
Quinn, supra note 51, at 891 n.147 (stating that in insider trading law, recklessness is a
sufficient state of mind for scienter, or the intent to deceive).
244 See Quinn, supra note 51, at 891 ti.147 (stating that in insider trading law, reckless-
ness is a sufficient state of mind km- scienter, or the intent to deceive).
243 Id.
246 See MODEL, PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (1985) (setting recklessness as the default where
the legislature fails to specify a tnens rea, or level of intent, for an offense).
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a particular element of an offense, the default state of mind is reck-
lessness.247 Applying this Model Penal Code principle to section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 would result in a recklessness standard, since neither
Congress nor the SEC specified the necessary state of mind. 248 Thus,
given O'Hagan's emphasis on protecting investors and the general ac-
ceptance of recklessness as a minimum mental state for liability, tip-
pers should be held liable when they recklessly cause the harmful re-
sults contained in the proposed standard. 249
3. Protecting Tippers Who Expose Criminal and Harmful Activity
A primary justification posited for the personal benefit require-
ment is that it protects tippers whose sole motive is to expose criminal
and harmful activity, as was the case with the tippers in Diths. 25° As dis-
cussed, however, the personal benefit requirement is overly broad be-
cause it protects tippers without this commendable purpose. 251 Thus,
to protect only those tippers who commendably seek to expose crimi-
nal and harmful activity, the proposed standard allows a tipper to pre-
sent the defense that he made the disclosure in a good fitith attempt
to prevent criminal activity reasonably certain to cause substantial
physical or financial harm to others.252
That this narrow defense is an appropriate balance of competing
polices finds support in the analogous confidentiality exceptions of
Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 253 These excep-
tions allow a lawyer, in limited situations, to disclose confidential in-
formation about a client to prevent physical or proprietary harm. 254
Recognizing the need to minimize the harm to client confidence that
such disclosures create, the drafters of the Model Rules of Professional




Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (2005); Mona. PENAL. Cons: § 2.02(3) (1985).
249 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); O'llagan, 521 U.S. at 658-59; 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5; MODEL
PENAL Cone § 2.02(3) (1985).
250 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 652 n.8, 667 & n.27 (emphasizing the defendant's role in ex-
posing fraud); id. at 676-77 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court created the
personal benefit requirement in the first place because the general benefit derived from
the tips outweighed the harm caused to the corporation's shareholders); Ebaugh, supra
note 3, at 291-92 (arguing for a personal benefit requirement under the misappropriation
theory partly in order to protect tippers who expose fraud).
251 See supra notes 170-181 and accompanying text.
252 See supra notes 170-181, 184-185 and accompanying text.
253 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (1)—(3) (2003).
254 Id.
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intend to benefit personally from making 11.255 Similarly, recognizing
the harm to investor confidence that misuse of information through
disclosure creates when that information is used to trade, the proposed
standard does not permit a tipper to disclose information used for trad-
ing merely because no personal benefit is sought in making the tip. 256
4. Reconciling the Standard with the Scope of Rule I Ob-5 Liability as
Defined by the Supreme Court
For several reasons, the proposed standard would not threaten the
established elements of Rule lOb-5 misappropriation liability. First, the
tipper, as a misappropriator, would still have to engage in deception, as
required by O'Hagan. 257 In addition, the possibility of liability absent a
personal benefit does not undermine the requirement that the tipper
breach a duty arising from a fiduciary relationship or similar relation-
ship of trust and confidence, as required by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Chiarella v. United States and O'Hagan.258 Although Dirks held that in
classical cases there is no breach of duty absent a personal benefit,
lower courts have suggested the contrary in misappropriation cases. 259
Furthermore, in O'Hagan, the Supreme Court implicitly agreed with
these lower courts when it alluded to agency principles, which provide
that using information to the detriment of the information owner con-
stitutes a breach of duty. 26° Thus, the proposed standard would satisfy
the breach of duty requirement despite its lack of a personal benefit
requirement. 261 By requiring this breach of duty, the proposed standard
255 See id. at R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (emphasizing that trust is the "hallmark" of the attorney-
client relationship because it encourages clients to seek legal assistance and to communi-
cate fully).
256 See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 658-59 (discussing the harm that trading on misappropri-
ated information causes to investor confidence).
247 See id. at 654-55.
256 See id. at 652 (requiring a duty); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980)
(requiring a duty). The proposed standard would also leave intact the requirement that
the tippee know, or should know, that the tipper breached the duty. See SEC v. Musella, 748
E. Supp. 1028, 1038 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (imposing the requirement).
259 See SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68, 77 (1st Cir. 2000) (suggesting that requiring a
breach of duty, without more, probably means that a personal benefit is not required);
SEC v. Gonzalez de Castilla, 184 E. Supp. 2d 365, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (treating breach of
duty and personal benefit as two separate and distinct elements of tipper/tippee liability).
260 See °Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653-55; Brief for Appellee, supra note 76, at 42-43; RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 COIL, a (1958).
261 See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653-55; Sargent, 229 F.3(1 at 77; Gonzalez de Castilla, 184 F.
Stipp, 2c1 at 375; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 mt. a (1958).
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would protect those market participants who gain information through
lawful skill and diligencc. 262
Finally, this standard would preserve the statutory requirement
that the tipper's deception occur "in connection with" a securities
trade.263 As O'Hagan made clear, the "in connection with" require-
ment is satisfied when the misappropriator's deceptive breach of duty
and his or her own securities trade coincide.2" In addition, the fed-
eral securities laws tend not to distinguish between acts committed
personally and acts done indirectly through other persons. 265 Thus, it
reasonably follows that the "in connection with" requirement may
properly be satisfied where a tipper deceptively breaches a duty by
recklessly causing another to trade. 266
The flexible nature of this interpretation of "in connection with"
is appropriate because it serves the purposes of section 10(6). 267 Al-
though the proposed standard's compliance with the "in connection
with" requirement is more attenuated than the factual scenario ad-
dressed by O'Hagan, in which the trading misappropriator's deceptive
breach of duty and his securities trade occurred simultaneously, the
Supreme Court recently and unanimously indicated that the "in con-
nection with" requirement may be construed flexibly, rather than
technically and restrictively, in order to effectuate the purposes of sec-
tion 10(b) in a reasonable manner." As O'Hagan made clear, one of
these purposes is to promote investor confidence, a confidence that is
threatened by trades that result from informational I 11 i suse . 269 Thus,
the proposed standard's heightened prevention of' trades based on
262 See Pritchard, supra note 76, at 51 (stating that requiring a breach of duty protects
individuals who have gained their informational advantage through superior insight or
hard work).
2" See Securities Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000) (requiring the fraud
to be "in connection with" a securities trade).
2" ()Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655-56.
266 cf. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78t(h)) ("INJot only are insiders for-
bidden by their fiduciary relationship from personally using undisclosed corporate infor-
mation to their advantage, but they may not give such information to an outsider for the
same improper purpose of exploiting the information for their personal gain."); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14e-3(d) (2005) (providing that "it shall be unlawful ... to communicate material,
nonpublic information relating to a tender offer to any other person under circumstances
in which it is reasonably foreseeable that such communication is likely to result in" trading
that violates rule 14e-3).
266 See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655-56; cf. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659; 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(d).
267 See SEC v. Zanford, 535 U.S. 813, 819-20 (2002); °Hagan, 521 U.S. at 658-59.
266 See Zunford, 535 U.S. at 819-20.
269 °flagon, 521 U.S. at 658-59.
580	 Boston College Law 1?euiew
	 [Vol. 47:547
informational misuse, through a flexible interpretation of the "in
connection with" requirement, is appropriate. 2"
CONCLUSION
In misappropriation cases involving tippers and tippees, courts
should not impose a requirement that the tipper intended to benefit
personally from the tip. Instead, courts should require that (1) the
tipper was at least reckless as to whether he or she would either benefit
personally or harm the information source by tipping, and (2) the
tipper was at least reckless as to whether someone in the line of tip-
pees would use the information to trade. This standard should be sub-
ject only to the tipper's defense that the tipper made the disclosure in
a good faith attempt to prevent criminal activity reasonably certain to
cause substantial physical or financial harm to others.
This standard not only comports with section 10(b), Rule 1013-5,
and Supreme Court precedent, but also best promotes the important
policies emphasized by the Supreme Court's decisions: promoting
investor confidence, while at the same time protecting tippers who
seek to expose criminal and harmful activity. Thus, unless Congress
passes a long-overdue insider trading statute, the Supreme Court
should replace the personal benefit requirement with the proposed
standard in tipper/tippee misappropriation cases. Lower courts, how-
ever, should not wait for Supreme Court action. While adhering to the
personal benefit requirement in classical cases as they must under our
system of binding precedent, lower courts should apply the proposed
standard in misappropriation cases. Doing so is not only permitted,
but also preferable in light of the principles and policies advanced by
the Supreme Court in O'Hagan.
DAVID T. COHEN
2  See Zanford, 535 U.S. at 819-20; °Hagan, 521 U.S. at 658-59. By requiring the tip-
per to be reckless as to the resulting trade, therefore, the proposed standard also addresses
the concerns raised by Yun that eliminating a personal benefit requirement might permit
tipper liability absent the tipper having "even the slightest" intent for someone else to
trade. See 327 F.3d at 1278.
